The European Courts by McAuliffe, Karen & Harmsen, R
The	  European	  Courts	  
Robert	  Harmsen	  and	  Karen	  McAuliffe	  	  
Introduction	  The	   ‘judicialisation	   of	   politics’	   has	   been	   one	   of	   the	   most	   important	  structural	  shifts	  on	  the	  European	  political	  landscape	  in	  the	  decades	  since	  the	  end	  of	   the	   Second	  World	  War	   (Conant	  2007;	  Kühn	  2006).	   Courts	   have	  overcome	  a	  historically	   subordinate	   role	   to	   become	   important	   political	   actors.	   	   This	   most	  obviously	   takes	   the	   shape	   of	   direct	   judicial	   interventions	   in	   policy-­‐making	  processes,	   with	   courts	   generally	   assuming	   the	   role	   of	   ‘veto	   players’,	   variably	  influencing	  both	  the	  forms	  and	  the	  substance	  of	  policy	  decisions.	   	  The	  effects	  of	  ‘judicialisation’,	   however,	   also	   manifest	   themselves	   in	   more	   subtle	   or	   indirect	  ways,	  rebalancing	  the	  relationship	  between	  law	  and	  politics.	  	  Litigation	  may	  thus	  emerge	   as	   a	   key	   instrument	   in	   the	   making	   of	   public	   policy,	   displacing	   more	  traditional	   modes	   of	   regulation	   and	   governance	   (Keleman	   2011;	   see	   also	  Volcansek	   in	   this	  Handbook).	   	  More	   generally,	   political	   actors	  may	   themselves	  adapt	   to	   this	   shifting	   balance	   between	   law	   and	   politics,	   internalising	   a	   more	  legally	  attuned	  mode	  of	  decision-­‐making	  as	  an	  anticipatory	  strategy	  to	  minimise	  the	   possibility	   of	   subsequent,	   negative	   judicial	   intervention.	   	   	   As	   Alec	   Stone	  Sweet	   (2000:	   204)	   appositely	   concludes	   his	   widely	   cited	   survey	   of	   the	  judicialisation	   phenomenon,	   ‘In	   the	   end,	   governing	   with	   judges	   also	   means	  governing	  like	  judges’.	  	  	  	   The	   general	   trend	   towards	   judicialisation	  may	   be	   seen	   across	   different	  levels	  of	  governance.	  	  At	  the	  national	  level,	  as	  Britta	  Rehder	  details	  elsewhere	  in	  this	  Handbook,	   there	   has	   notably	   been	   a	   diffusion	   of	   a	   distinctive	   (Kelsenian)	  model	   of	   constitutional	   court.	   	   Such	   courts	   first	   took	   root	   in	  Western	   Europe,	  
before	  subsequently	  emerging	  as	  a	  generalised	  (if	  not	  essential)	  feature	  of	  post-­‐transition	  democratic	  systems	  in	  Central	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.	   	  There	  have	  also,	  of	  course,	  been	  comparably	  dramatic	  developments	  at	  the	  European	  level,	  as	  two	  distinctive	   and	   distinctively	   effective	   bodies	   of	   supranational	   law	   have	   taken	  shape.	   	   The	   Luxembourg-­‐based	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   (CJEU)	  has	   emerged	   as	   a	   key	   driver	   of	   the	   European	   integration	   process,	   crafting	   an	  innovative	  constitutional	  architecture	  and	  system	  of	  regulation.	  The	  Strasbourg-­‐based	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (ECtHR)	   has	   played	   a	   similarly	  pioneering	  role,	  fashioning	  a	  uniquely	  effective	  system	  of	  regional	  human	  rights	  protection	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe’s	   European	   Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	  	  (ECHR).	  	  	  In	   broad	   terms,	   these	   developments	   at	   different	   levels	   have	   been	  mutually	   reinforcing,	   sustaining	   a	   generalised	   legitimation	   of	   judicial	   power	   in	  relation	   to	   the	   executive	   and	   the	   legislature.	   	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   however,	   this	  generalised	  logic	  of	  empowerment	  is	  tempered	  by	  the	  different	  relative	  positions	  of	  courts.	   	   Judicial	  actors	  will	  be	  conscious	  not	  only	  of	   their	  general	  position	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  other	  branches	  of	  government,	  but	  also	  of	  their	  specific	  position	  within	   formal	   judicial	   hierarchies	   and	   wider	   networks	   of	   influence.	   	   As	   such,	  differing	   institutional	   strategies	   and	   patterns	   of	   jurisprudential	   development	  may	  be	  expected	  (cf.	  Alter	  2009).	  It	   is	   thus	   against	   the	   background	   of	   this	   wider	   judicialisation	  phenomenon	  that	  the	  present	  chapter	  focuses	  on	   ‘the	  European	  Courts’.	   	   In	  the	  two	   main	   sections,	   the	   patterns	   of	   institutional	   development	   of	   the	   European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  are	  examined.	  	  Drawing	  particularly	   on	   the	   relevant	   political	   science	   and	   critical	   legal	   literatures,	  
particular	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  both	  questions	  of	   institutional	   legitimacy	  and	  the	  roles	  assumed	  by	   the	   respective	  courts	   in	   relation	   to	  wider	  political	  processes.	  	  This	   is	  complemented,	   in	   the	  conclusion,	  by	  an	  examination	  of	   the	  relationship	  between	   the	   two	   Courts,	   situated	   relative	   to	   the	   wider	   European	   (and	  international)	  trends	  towards	  judicialisation	  discussed	  above.	  
	  
Enunciating	  a	  Vision	  of	  Europe	  Although	   it	   was	   always	   intended	   that	   the	   ECSC	   and	   EEC	   should	   have	   a	  supreme	  court,	  its	  jurisdiction	  as	  established	  in	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  was	  limited:	  an	   administrative	   court,	   based	   in	   international	   law,	   with	   the	   jurisdiction	   to	  decide	  on	  the	  misuse	  of	  powers	  by	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  ECSC.	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Treaty	  made	  no	  mention	  of	   the	   type	  of	   legal	   system	  or	  principles	   that	   it	  might	  adopt	  in	  ensuring	  that	  law	  was	  observed.	   	  The	  Court	  was	  thus,	  through	  its	  case	  law,	  able	  to	  enunciate	  a	  vision	  of	  Europe	  that	  allowed	  it	  to	  develop	  and	  extend	  its	  jurisdiction	  under	   the	   treaties.	   	  The	  Court	  has,	   in	  effect,	   ‘constitutionalised’	   the	  EU	   legal	   order,	   and	   by	   so	   doing	   transformed	   that	   Union	   from	   a	   traditional	  international	  organisation,	  albeit	  with	  supranational	  elements,	  into	  a	  new	  type	  of	  legal	   order,	   which	   binds	   not	   only	   member	   states	   but	   also	   individuals.	   	   In	   the	  seminal	  case	  of	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	   in	  1963,	   the	  Court	  declared	  that	   the	  EEC	  was	  not	  governed	  by	  traditional	  international	  law,	  but	  rather	  that	  it	  was	  a	  “new	  legal	  
order’1.	   	   In	   Costa	  v	   ENEL	   in	   1964,	   the	   Court	   reaffirmed	   that	   new	   legal	   order,	  distinct	  from	  traditional	  international	  law,	  and	  set	  out	  the	  principle	  that	  EU	  law	  should	  be	  supreme	  over	  member	  states’	  national	   laws2.	   	  There	   then	   followed	  a	  series	  of	  cases	  throughout	  the	  1960s	  and	  70s	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  embedded	  that	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Case	  26/62	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos	  v	  Nederlandse	  Administratie	  der	  Belastingen	  [1963]	  ECR	  1.	  
2	  Case	  6/64	  Costa	  v	  ENEL	  [1964]	  ECR	  585.	  
principle	  of	   supremacy	   in	   the	  EU	   legal	   order,	   in	  particular	   in	   its	   Internationale	  
Handelsgesellschaft	   and	   Simmenthal	   rulings3.	   	   This	   principle	   of	   supremacy	   has	  been	   termed	   ‘the	   most	   important	   constitutional	   issue	   of	   the	   [EU]	   legal	   order”	  (Eleftheriadis	   1998,	   p.	   257),	   and	   the	   impact	   it	   has	   had	   on	   the	   national	   legal	  orders	   of	   member	   states	   is	   certainly	   beyond	   what	   might	   be	   expected	   from	  traditional	  international	  law.	  Hand	  in	  hand	  with	  that	  principle	  of	  supremacy,	  the	  Court	  also	  developed	  the	  principle	  of	  direct	  effect.	  	  Direct	  effect	  allows	  individuals	  to	  invoke	  provisions	  of	  EU	  law	  directly	  before	  their	  national	  courts.	   	  That	  principle	  was	  first	  set	  out,	  once	  again,	   in	   the	   case	  of	  Van	  Gend	  en	  Loos,	   in	  which	   the	  Court	   stated	   that	   the	  subjects	  of	   the	   ‘new	  legal	  order’	  were	  “not	  only	  the	  member	  states	  but	  also	  their	  
nationals’4.	   	  For	  the	  first	  time,	   in	  any	  legal	  system,	   individuals	  had	  rights	  which	  flowed	   directly	   from	   international	   (EU)	   law	   and	   which	   national	   courts	   were	  bound	   to	   uphold.	   	   	   The	  Court	   has	   continued	   to	   broaden	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	  principle	  of	  direct	  effect	  and,	  over	  the	  years,	  has	  extended	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	   to	   further	   Treaty	   articles,	   decisions,	   and,	   most	   controversially,	   to	  directives.	   	   By	   these	   principles	   (among	   some	   others)	   the	   CJEU	   enunciated	   a	  vision	   of	   Europe,	   which	  was	   vastly	   different	   and	   ran	   deeper	   to	   what	  member	  states	  might	  have	  envisaged	  when	  they	  agreed	  to	  create	  the	  common	  market.	  	  	  	  
Acceptance	  of	  the	  constitutionalisation	  paradigm?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Case	  11/70	   Internationale	  Handelsgesellschaft	  v	  Einfuhr-­‐und	  Vorratsstelle	  für	  Getreide	  und	  Futtermittel	   [1970]	  
ECR	  1125,	  Case	  92/78	  Simmenthal	  SpA	  v	  Commission	  [1979]	  ECR	  777.	  
4	  Supra	  note	  1.	  
The	  ‘activism’	  of	  the	  CJEU	  has	  been	  heavily	  criticised,	  in	  particular	  in	  legal	  literature	  from	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  the	  1980s	  onwards5.	  There	  is	  also	  a	  significant	  political	   science	   literature	   on	   that	   court.	   	   The	   question	   of	   most	   interest	   to	  political	  scientists	  is	  why	  these	  ‘radical’	  decisions	  of	  the	  CJEU	  were,	  and	  continue	  to	   be,	   accepted	   and	   applied	   by	  member	   state	   courts6.	   	   There	   are	   a	   number	   of	  theories	   as	   to	   why	   this	   is	   the	   case,	   each	   of	   which	   focuses	   on	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   CJEU	   and	   national	   courts	   in	   an	   effort	   to	   explain	   the	  constitutionalisation	   paradigm.	   	   The	   basis	   of	   that	   relationship	   lies	   in	   the	  procedure	   for	   preliminary	   rulings	   under	   Article	   267	   TFEU.	   	   This	   article	   is	  frequently	   termed	   the	   ‘keystone’	   of	   EU	   law,	   for	   without	   it	   there	   would	   be	   no	  principle	  of	  supremacy,	  or	  indeed	  much	  EU	  law	  at	  all	  (Ward	  2009,	  p.	  65).	  	  Under	  Article	  267	  member	  state	  courts	  may,	  and	  in	  some	  cases	  must,	  refer	  questions	  of	  EU	   law	   to	   the	  CJEU	   for	   preliminary	   rulings	   on	   the	   interpretation	   of	   the	  Treaty	  and	   the	   validity	   and	   interpretation	   of	   the	   acts	   of	   the	   institutions.	   	   Those	  preliminary	   rulings	   are	   then	   binding	   on	   the	   national	   courts	   that	   made	   the	  references	  and	  on	  other	  member	  state	  courts	  before	  which	  the	  same	  or	  similar	  questions	  may	  be	  raised7.	  	  All	  of	  the	  constitutional-­‐type	  principles	  developed	  by	  the	   CJEU	   were	   developed	   in	   judgments	   given	   in	   response	   to	   references	   for	  preliminary	   rulings.	   	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   CJEU	   was	   dependent	   on	   those	  references	  from	  national	  courts	  in	  order	  to	  develop	  EU	  law.	  	  Most	  commentators	  agree	   that	   on	   the	  whole,	   national	   courts	   (in	   particular	   lower	   courts)	   have	   not	  only	  failed	  to	  resist	  the	  ‘constitutionalisation’	  of	  the	  EU	  legal	  order	  by	  the	  CJEU,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Following	  the	  publication	  of	  Rasmussen’s	  On	  Law	  and	  Policy	  at	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  (1986)	  many	  commentators	  became	  very	  critical	  of	   the	  Court.	   	  See,	   in	  particular,	  Coppell	  &	  O’Neill	   (1992)	  and	  Mancini	  (1991).	  
6	  See,	   for	  example:	  Dehousse	  (1994);	  Dehousse	  (1998);	  Alter	   (2001);	  Arnull	   (1999);	  Slaughter,	  Stone	  Sweet	  and	  
Weiler	  (1998).	  7	  Cf	  Case	  283/81	  Srl	  CILFIT	  and	  Lanificio	  di	  Gavardo	  SpA	  	  v	  Ministry	  of	  Health	  [1982]	  ERC	  3415.	  
but	  have	  enthusiastically	  played	  their	  part	  (Azoulai	  and	  Dehousse	  2013,	  p.357).	  So,	   given	   the	   impact	   of	   those	   seminal	   judgments	   of	   the	   CJEU	   on	   national	   legal	  systems	   and	   sovereignty,	  why	  did	   national	   courts	   continue	   to	   engage	  with	   the	  preliminary	  ruling	  mechanism?	  Arguably	  the	  most	  influential	  work	  scrutinising	  the	  policies	  and	  strategies	  of	  the	  CJEU	  was	  done	  by	  Joseph	  Weiler.	  	  Weiler	  claimed	  that	  the	  CJEU	  was	  unable	  to	   force	   a	   pace	   of	   integration	   that	   did	   not	   conform	   to	   member	   states’	   own	  interests	  and	  so	  had	  to	  engage	  in	  a	   ‘dialogue’	  with	  national	  courts,	  working-­‐out	  justifications	   for	   doctrines	   that	   were	   ‘acceptable’	   to	   member	   states	   (Weiler,	  1982).	  	  Through	  that	  dialogue,	  authority	  was	  gradually	  allocated	  between	  the	  EU	  and	   national	   legal	   orders	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   “enhancing	   judicial	  power	  on	  
both	   levels”	   (Stone	   Sweet	   2010,	   p.	   16).	   The	   success	   of	   the	   Court’s	   integration	  project	  was,	  according	  to	  Weiler,	  due	  to	  a	  balance	  between	  a	  supranational	  legal	  system	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   and	   an	   intergovernmental	   legislative	   system	   on	   the	  other.	   A	   neo-­‐functionalist	   view	   submits	   that	   since	   law	   exists	   in	   a	   technical	  autonomous	   arena,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has	   its	   own	   discourse	   and	   autonomy.	  Scholars	   such	   as	   Burley/Slaughter	   and	  Mattli	   claim	   that,	   by	   introducing	   direct	  effect	   and	   supremacy,	   the	   CJEU	   transformed	   national	   courts	   into	   EU	   courts	   in	  their	  own	  right.	  	  As	  more	  litigation	  was	  brought	  before	  national	  courts	  by	  private	  actors,	  more	  references	   for	  preliminary	  rulings	  were	  sent	  by	  national	  courts	   to	  the	  CJEU.	   	  By	  empowering	   individuals	  and	  national	  courts	   in	  this	  way	  the	  CJEU	  made	  it	  advantageous	  for	  those	  actors	  to	  use	  Community	  norms	  and	  thereby	  to	  foster	  legal	  integration	  (Craig	  2003,	  p.	  31).	  	  
Dehousse	  points	  out,	  however,	  that	  such	  analyses	  are	  limited	  as	  they	  fail	  to	  take	  account	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   not	   all	   national	   courts	   behave	   alike	   and	   in	   fact	   higher	  courts	   tend	   not	   to	   be	   as	   ‘enthusiastic’	   as	   lower	   Courts	   (Azoulai	   and	   Dehousse	  2013).	  	  Alter,	  in	  her	  work,	  does	  deal	  with	  those	  differing	  degrees	  of	  enthusiasm	  and	  submits	  that	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  CJEU	  and	  national	  courts	  is	  based	  on	  competition	  between	  courts	  within	  member	  state	  legal	  orders.	  	  Under	  Article	  267	  TFEU	  all	  member	  state	  courts,	  including	  lower	  courts,	  have	  direct	  access	  to	  the	  CJEU.	  	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  direct	  effect	  and	  supremacy	  of	  EU	  law,	  lower	   national	   courts	   can	   refuse	   to	   apply	   decisions	   of	   higher	   courts.	   	   Indeed,	  lower	  national	  courts	  do	  appear	  to	  have	  taken	  full	  advantage	  of	  their	  new	  role	  as	  watchdogs	  of	  EU	   law,	   continuing	   to	  make	   references	   to	   the	  CJEU	  under	  Article	  267	  TFEU,	  and	  higher	  national	   courts	  have	  had	   to	   “reposition	  themselves	  to	  the	  
new	  reality”	   (Alter	   1998,	   p.	   243).	   	   In	   effect,	   lower	   courts	   have	   “cajoled”	   higher	  courts	  into	  accepting	  the	  supremacy	  doctrine	  (Alter	  1998,	  p.	  242).	  An	  intergovernmentalist	  view,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  denies	  the	  autonomy	  of	  the	   CJEU	   and	   claims	   that	   its	   role	   is	   merely	   one	   of	   a	   guarantor	   of	   interstate	  bargains/agreements.	   	  According	   to	   scholars	   such	  as	  Garrett	   (1992,	  1995)	  and	  Weingast	   (1993),	   the	   Court’s	   ‘power’	   comes	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   can	   assist	  member	   states	   to	   overcome	   problems	   of	   commitment	   and	   collective	   action:	  because	   of	   their	   interest	   in	   the	   development	   of	   the	   common	  market,	   member	  states	   gave	   the	   CJEU	   jurisdiction	   not	   only	   to	   supervise	   the	   activities	   of	   the	  institutions	   of	   that	   common	  market,	   but	   also	   to	   control	   their	   own	   activities	   in	  that	  sphere.	  	  Thus,	  principles	  such	  as	  supremacy	  and	  direct	  effect	  were	  accepted	  by	  member	   states.	   	   In	   an	   intergovernmentalist	   view,	   the	  mere	   possibility	   that	  member	   states	   may	   resist	   CJEU	   judgments,	   subjecting	   them	   to	   constitutional	  
review	  etc.	   is	   enough	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	  Court	   remains	  within	   a	   sphere	   that	   is	  acceptable	  to	  those	  member	  states.	  	  The	  intergovernmentalist	  view	  is,	  however,	  often	  criticised	  by	  lawyers	  for	  not	  acknowledging	  the	  autonomous	  nature	  of	  law.	  	  	  One	  idea	  common	  to	  most	  of	  those	  theories	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  left	  to	  its	  own	  devices,	   separate	   from	   the	   other	   EU	   institutions,	   “tucked	   away	   in	   the	   fairytale	  
Grand	   Duchy	   of	   Luxembourg,	   the	   Court	   was	   able	   to	   implement	   its	   own	   EU	  integration	   agenda	   even	   against	   the	   interests	   of	   some	  member	   states	   (Weiler,	  1982;	  Burley	  and	  Mattli,	  1992).	  	  Recently,	  however,	  new	  literature	  has	  emerged,	  based	  on	  studies	  of	  EU	  and	  national	  archives	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  development	  of	  EU	   law	   (cf.	  Davies	   and	  Rasmussen,	   2013,	   p.	   2).	   	   This	   literature	   challenges	   that	  notion	  of	  ‘integration	  by	  stealth’	  and	  shows	  that	  national	  governments	  were	  not	  only	  aware	  but	  were,	  at	  least	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Germany,	  broadly	  facilitative	  of	  that	  integration	  process.	  	  Davies	  and	  Rasmussen	  (2013)	  claim	  that	  national	  European	  law	  associations,	   the	  Court	   itself	   and	   the	   legal	   service	  of	   the	  Commission	  were	  the	   key	   driving	   forces	   in	   the	   development	   of	   EU	   law	   –	   that	   it	   was	   “a	   battle	  
between	  legal	  elites”.	  	  
A	  Socio-­‐Economic	  Court	  It	   was	   not	   envisaged	   that	   the	   jurisdiction	   of	   the	   original	   court	   should	  extend	   to	   the	   social	   sphere.	   	   Yet,	   through	   its	   rulings	   in	   a	   number	   of	   landmark	  cases,	  the	  CJEU	  has	  adopted	  the	  role	  of	  a	  socio-­‐economic	  court	  within	  a	  Union	  of	  much	  broader	  scope	  than	  initially	  envisaged.	  	  The	  successful	  completion	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  was	  due	  in	  a	  large	  part	  to	  a	  shift	  in	  approach	  by	  the	  European	  Commission	  from	  exhaustive	  to	  minimum	  harmonisation.	  	  That	  shift	  in	  fact	  originated	  in	  the	  CJEU’s	  case	  law,	  specifically	  in	  
its	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   national	   standards.	   	   According	   to	   this	  principle,	   set	   out	   in	   Cassis	   de	   Dijon8,	   a	   good	   produced	   and	   marketed	   lawfully	  under	   the	   rules	   of	   any	   one	   member	   state	   must	   be	   allowed	   to	   circulate	   freely	  within	  the	  internal	  market9.	  	  This	  ruling	  has	  been	  described	  as	  a	  “constitutional	  innovation”	   because	   it	   introduced	   a	   mode	   of	   integration	   unforeseen	   by	   the	  member	  states	  (Stone	  Sweet	  2004,	  p.	  135).	   	  The	  Court	   justified	  its	  Cassis	  ruling	  on	   the	   grounds	   that	   traders	   should	   not	   suffer	   because	   of	   the	   absence	   of	  legislative	   harmonisation	   at	   the	   EU	   level,	   but	   should	   have	   access	   to	   the	   entire	  internal	  market	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  access	  to	  the	  market	  of	  any	  member	  state.	  	  This,	  of	  course,	  provided	  “a	  powerful	  incentive	  to	  harmonise	  the	  most	  important	  market	  
rules”	  to	  prevent	  investment	  and	  production	  moving	  to	  the	  member	  states	  with	  the	   lowest	   regulatory	   costs	   (Stone	   Sweet	   2004,	   p.	   136).	   	   Traders	   could	   invoke	  that	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  national	  courts	  and	  their	  rights	  under	  EU	  law	  had	  to	  be	  upheld	  by	  those	  national	  courts.	  The	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition	   is	   indicative	   of	  what	  Maduro	   terms	  the	   constitutionalisation	   of	   negative	   integration	   (Maduro,	   1997,	   p.	   3-­‐4).	   	   That	  principle	   also	   highlights	   the	   significant	   ‘asymmetry’	   between	   positive	   and	  negative	  integration10.	   	  As	  a	  result	  of	  the	  Dassonville/Cassis	   line	  of	  case	  law,	  the	  Court	  has	  almost	  unlimited	  freedom	  to	  scrutinise	  ever-­‐increasing	  policy	  areas	  for	  rules	  that	  may	  potentially	  hinder	  the	  exercise	  of	  individual	  rights.	  	  However,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  Case	  120/78	  Rewe-­‐Zentral	  v	  Bundesmonopolverwaltung	  für	  Branntwein	  [1979]	  ECR	  649.	  
9	  Note:	   In	   order	   to	   complete	   the	   internal	  market,	   both	   fiscal	   (e.g.	   taxes	   and	   duties)	   and	   non-­‐fiscal	   barriers	   to	  
trade	  had	  to	  be	  removed.	  	  Articles	  28-­‐29	  of	  the	  EC	  Treaty	  were	  intended	  to	  eliminate	  all	  non-­‐fiscal	  barriers	  to	  the	  
free	  movement	  of	  goods	  throughout	  the	   internal	  market.	   	   In	   its	  Dassonville	   ruling	   (Case	  8/74	  [1974]	  ECR	  837),	  
the	   Court	   held	   that	   any	   trading	   rules	   enacted	   by	   a	  member	   state	  which	   are	   capable	   of	   hindering,	   directly	   or	  
indirectly,	  actually	  or	  potentially,	   intra-­‐Community	  trade	  shall	  be	  considered	  measures	  having	  equivalent	  effect	  
to	   non-­‐fiscal	   barriers	   to	   trade	   (MEQRs).	   	   The	   Cassis	   de	   Dijon	   ruling	   extended	   the	   Dassonville	   principles	   to	  
indistinctly	  applicable	  measures	  (IAMs)	  –	  i.e.	  to	  all	  measures	  covering	  all	  goods,	  whether	  domestic	  or	  imported,	  
as	  well	  as	  introducing	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition.	  10	  Positive	   integration	   refers	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   harmonising	   legislation	   at	   the	   European	   level;	   negative	  integration	  refers	  to	  the	  prohibition	  of	  national-­‐level	  legislation	  that	  may	  violate	  Treaty	  objectives	  in	  order	  to	  remove	  barriers	  to	  trade.	  
Court’s	  case	  law	  can	  only	  achieve	  negative	  integration	  (Scharpf,	  1999,	  ch.2)	  –	  it	  cannot	   impose	   a	   common	   European	   regime	   to	   replace	   discriminatory	   national	  rules.	   	   ‘Positive	   integration’	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   can	   only	   be	   achieved	   though	  legislation	  and	  as	   such	  depends	  on	  a	  broad	   consensus	  and	   can	  be	   inhibited	  by	  political	   disagreements	   (Scharpf,	   2010).	   	   Negative	   integration	   has	   developed	  what	  Scharpf	   terms	  a	   “deregulatory	  dynamics”:	  a	  decision	  of	   the	  CJEU	  against	  a	  member	   state	   effectively	   reduces	   its	   potential	   for	   democratically	   accountable	  policy-­‐making,	  yet	  politics	  at	  the	  European	  level	  cannot	  make	  up	  for	  the	  loss.	  Two	   relatively	   recent	   cases,	   Laval	   and	   Viking,	   illustrate	   the	   difficult	  balance	   that	   the	   Court	   aims	   to	   strike.	   Those	   cases	   occurred	   against	   the	  background	   of	   the	   Posted	   Workers	   Directive11.	   	   That	   directive	   sets	   out	   the	  employment	  conditions	  which	  should	  apply	  to	  workers	  temporarily	  posted	  from	  one	   member	   state	   to	   another	   and	   requires	   the	   host	   state	   to	   apply	   to	   posted	  workers	   ‘a	   nucleus	   of	   mandatory	   rules	   for	   minimum	   protection’	   listed	   in	   the	  directive.	   	   Initially,	   the	   directive	   was	   welcomed,	   particularly	   by	   wealthier	  member	  states,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  protecting	  labour	  standards	  from	  being	  undermined	  by	   posted	   workers	   from	   poorer	   states	   (i.e.	   preventing	   social	   dumping).	  	  However,	  the	  question	  remained	  as	  to	  whether	  this	  was	  a	  minimum	  labour	  law	  directive	  –	  providing	  protection	  for	  host-­‐state	  labour	  and/or	  posted	  workers	  or	  a	  free	  movement	  of	  services	  directive	  –	  effectively	  limiting	  the	  regulatory	  powers	  of	  the	  host	  state.	  	  The	  CJEU,	  in	  the	  Laval	  and	  Viking	  cases	  had	  to	  try	  to	  balance	  the	  different	  objectives	  of	  the	  Treaty	  (free	  movement)	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  adequate	  social	   protection	   of	   workers	   on	   the	   other.	   	   Laval	   concerned	   industrial	   action	  taken	   by	   Swedish	   trade	   unions	   against	   a	   Latvian	   company	   employing	   Latvian	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  Directive	   96/71/EC	   OF	   THE	   EUROPEAN	   PARLIAMENT	   AND	   OF	   THE	   COUNCIL	   of	   16	   December	   1996	  concerning	  the	  posting	  of	  workers	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  provision	  of	  services	  [1997]	  OJ(L)18	  1-­‐6.	  
workers,	  in	  Sweden,	  for	  about	  40%	  less	  wages	  than	  Swedish	  workers.	  	  In	  Viking,	  Finnish	   trade	  unions	   took	  action	   to	   try	   to	  prevent	  a	  Finnish	  shipping	  company	  re-­‐registering	  a	  ship	  under	  a	  Latvian	  flag	  in	  order	  to	  employ	  Latvian	  workers	  at	  lower	  rates	  and	   in	  worse	  conditions	   than	  Finnish	  workers.	   	   In	   its	   judgments	   in	  these	  cases,	  the	  Court	  first	  stated	  that	   it	  was	  for	  the	  relevant	  national	  courts	  to	  ultimately	  answer	  the	  questions	  –	  thereby	  assigning	  this	  difficult	  balancing	  act	  to	  the	  member	  states.	  	  However,	  it	  then	  went	  on	  to	  provide	  a	  narrow	  reading	  of	  the	  Posted	   Workers	   directive	   by	   observing	   that	   it	   is	   ‘first’	   intended	   to	   ‘ensure	   a	  
climate	  of	  fair	  competition	  between	  national	  undertakings	  and	  undertakings	  which	  
provide	   services	   transnationally”12.	   	   The	   ‘compromise’	   reached	   by	   the	   CJEU,	  between	  free	  movement	  economic	  concerns	  and	  member	  states’	  legitimate	  social	  policy	   objectives	   appears	   to	   be	   that	   provided	   the	   host	   state	   has	   complied	  precisely	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  directive,	  then	  posted	  workers	  may	  enjoy	  the	  better	   terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  employment	   in	   the	  host	  state.	   	   If	   that	   is	  not	   the	  case,	   then	  an	   attempt	   to	   apply	   the	  host-­‐state	   rules	  will	   be	   contrary	   to	   the	   free	  movement	  rules.	  The	   Viking	   and	   Laval	   judgments	   have	   been	   heavily	   criticised	   for	   their	  narrow	  interpretation	  of	  the	  directive	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  social	  rights.	  	  The	  rulings	  in	   these	   cases	   are	   clear	   steps	   towards	   “the	   hard	   law	   of	   negative	   integration”	  (Joerges	   and	   Rödl	   2009)	   in	   instances	   where	   political	   processes	   seem	   slow	   or	  unappealing.	  	  Just	  how	  far	  the	  Court	  has	  extended	  its	  jurisdiction	  into	  the	  social	  sphere	   is	   evident.	   	   However,	   we	   should	   question	   whether	   this	  constitutionalisation	   of	   negative	   integration	   is	   in	   fact	   preferable	   to	   soft-­‐law	  mechanisms	   of	   coordination.	   	   The	   ‘socio-­‐economic’	   CJEU	   attempts	   to	   balance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Laval	  para	  74	  
conflicting	  interests	  but,	  as	  Maduro	  notes	  “has	  never	  clearly	  addressed	  the	  issue	  of	  
which	  interests	  should	  be	  balanced”	  (Maduro	  1997,	  p.	  54).	  	  
Contemporary	  Challenges	  It	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   roles	   adopted	   by	   the	   CJEU	   have	   changed	   over	   time.	  	  	  Today’s	  Court	  faces	  a	  number	  of	  contemporary	  challenges	  ranging	  from	  stricter	  public	  scrutiny	  to	  the	  growing	  importance	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  litigation	  in	  its	  case	   law.	   	  One	  of	   the	  most	   significant	   challenges,	  however,	   is	   that	  of	   increased	  workload,	  particularly	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  EU	  enlargements.	  	  Unsurprisingly	  the	   workload	   of	   the	   original	   ECSC	   Court	   was	   minimal	   (only	   34	   cases	   were	  brought	  before	  that	  court	  between	  1952	  and	  1957,	  and	  only	  12	  judgments	  were	  delivered	  in	  that	  time).	  	  However,	  as	  the	  CJEU	  extended	  its	  competence,	  and	  with	  each	   new	   enlargement,	   that	   workload	   increased	   many	   hundredfold	   (632	   new	  cases	  were	  brought	  before	   the	  CJEU	  and	  617	  before	   the	  General	  Court	   in	  2012	  alone).	   	   While	   this	   increase	   is	   not	   on	   a	   scale	   comparable	   with	   that	   of	   the	  Strasbourg	  court	  (see	  infra)	  it	  is	  nonetheless	  significant.	  	  Over	  the	  years	  various	  efforts	   have	   been	   made	   to	   alleviate	   the	   workload	   of	   the	   CJEU,	   such	   as	   the	  introduction	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  First	  Instance	  in	  1989	  and	  subsequent	  allocation	  of	  particular	   types	   of	   action	   to	   that	   court	   as	   well	   as	   the	   dispensing	   of	   the	   oral	  hearing	  in	  certain	  circumstances,	  use	  of	  expedited	  or	  accelerated	  procedures	  and	  the	  possibility	  of	   judgment	  being	  delivered	   in	  a	   case	  without	  an	  opinion	  of	   the	  advocate	  general.	  	  The	  number	  of	  judges	  at	  the	  Court	  has	  also	  almost	  doubled	  in	  size	  since	  2004.	   	  Yet,	   in	  spite	  of	  such	  efforts,	   the	  CJEU	  remains	  overloaded	  and	  under	  pressure	  with	  its	  caseload.	  	  At	  the	  end	  of	  2012	  there	  was	  a	  backlog	  of	  886	  cases	   pending	   before	   the	   CJEU	   and	   1237	   cases	   pending	   before	   the	   General	  
Court13.	   	  Moreover,	   as	  Maduro	  and	  Azoulai	  point	  out,	   the	   increased	  number	  of	  judges	  may	  allow	  the	  Court	  to	  increase	  its	  judicial	  output,	  but	  this	  also	  runs	  the	  risk	  of	  a	  loss	  of	  institutional	  memory	  and	  a	  reduction	  in	  collegiality	  (Maduro	  and	  Azoulai,	  2010).	  The	   ‘mega-­‐enlargement’	   of	  May	  2004	  brought	  with	   it	   opportunities	   and	  challenges.	   	  Most	   significantly,	   the	   CJEU	   had	   the	   opportunity	   to	   re-­‐evaluate	   its	  working	   methods.	   	   The	   sheer	   scale	   of	   that	   enlargement	   forced	   the	   Court	   to	  streamline	  its	  system	  of	  management	  as	  well	  as	  introduce	  extensive	  changes	  to	  its	  integral	  multi-­‐language	  system	  of	  translation	  (cf	  McAuliffe,	  2008).	  	  In	  order	  to	  “counteract	  the	  expanding	  average	  length	  of	  proceedings”14	  a	   series	  of	  measures	  were	  put	  into	  practice	  progressively	  from	  May	  200415.	  The	  Court	  also	  reassessed	  its	   practice	   of	   publishing	   judgments	   in	   the	   European	   Court	   Reports	   (ECR),	  adopting	  a	  policy	  of	  selective	  publication16.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  challenges,	  the	  question	  that	  immediately	  arose	  was	  whether	  that	  ‘mega-­‐enlargement’	  would	  represent	  a	  qualitative	  or	  merely	  a	  quantitative	  change	  in	  the	  functioning	  of	  that	  institution.	  	  While	   enlargement	   was	   as	   much	   a	   pretext	   as	   a	   cause	   for	   some	   changes	  introduced	  that	  had	  been	  mooted	  for	  years,	  there	  have	  been	  some	  notable	  shifts	  in	   the	   working	   methods	   of	   the	   Court	   as	   a	   consequence	   of	   that	   enlargement.	  Preliminary	  studies,	  focusing	  on	  the	  role	  of	  language	  and	  translation	  at	  the	  CJEU,	  have	  shown	  that	  the	  introduction	  of	  thirteen	  new	  languages	  (between	  2004	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13	  Source:	  Court	  of	  Justice	  Annual	  Report	  2012.	  
14	  Court	  of	  Justice	  Annual	  Report	  2004,	  I-­‐A	  (1.3),	  p.	  13.	  15	  Those	   measures	   included	   adopting	   a	   stricter	   approach	   to	   granting	   extensions	   of	   time-­‐limits	   for	   submitting	  
pleadings;	   decreasing	   the	   size	   and	   content	   of	   reports	   for	   the	   hearing	   and	   ceasing	   to	   produce	   a	   report	   of	   the	  
judge-­‐rapporteur	  in	  cases	  that	  do	  not	  require	  an	  oral	  hearing.	  
16	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  texts	  of	  decisions	  not	  published	  in	  the	  ECR	  are	  nonetheless	  accessible	  to	  the	  public	  
in	  electronic	  form	  on	  the	  website	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  the	  language	  or	  languages	  available.	  	  Because	  of	  their	  
perceived	   importance	   for	   the	   interpretation	   and	   uniform	   application	   of	   Community	   law	   throughout	   the	   EU	  
member	   states,	   all	   judgments	   delivered	   in	   references	   for	   a	   preliminary	   ruling	   continue	   to	   be	  published	   in	   the	  
ECR.	  
2013)	  and	  thirteen	  new	  cultures	  have	  indeed	  marked	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  dynamics	  of	  that	   institution	   (McAuliffe,	   2008,	   2010).	  The	  most	  noticeable	   and	  probably	   the	  most	  significant	  change	  in	  its	  working	  methods	  has	  been	  the	  introduction	  of	  an	  official	   pivot	   translation	   system.	   The	   question	   arises	   as	   to	  whether	   an	   infinite	  number	  of	  languages	  can	  continue	  to	  be	  absorbed	  by	  the	  language	  regime	  of	  the	  CJEU	   without	   certain	   changes	   being	   made	   to	   the	   use	   of	   language	   within	   that	  institution.	  	  Following	  on	  from	  that,	  what	  impact	  are	  such	  changes	  likely	  to	  have	  on	  the	  case	  law	  being	  produced	  by	  that	  Court?	  	  The	  introduction	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  such	   a	   large	   cohort	   of	   staff	   from	   the	   new	   member	   states	   certainly	   adds	   an	  element	   of	   diversity	   to	   that	   institution	   but	   it	   also	   impacts	   on	   the	   institutional	  balance,	  which	   in	   turn	  may	   have	   implications	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   case	  law17.	  	  
The	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  The	  system	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  which	  has	  developed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   (ECHR)	   stands	   as	   one	   of	   the	  earliest	   and	   most	   important	   achievements	   of	   the	   process	   of	   European	  integration.	  	  The	  Convention	  system	  has	  further	  emerged	  as	  an	  exemplar	  on	  the	  wider	  international	  stage,	  a	  comparatively	  rare	  instance	  of	  the	  successful	  judicial	  enforcement	  of	  individual	  rights	  beyond	  the	  state	  which	  has	  served	  as	  a	  source	  of	   inspiration	   for	   other	   regional	   systems.	   	   A	   burgeoning	   legal	   literature	   has	  accompanied	  the	  development	  of	  the	  system,	  largely	  focused	  on	  the	  exposition	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  These	   questions	   are	   currently	   the	   focus	   of	   an	   ERC-­‐funded	   study	   on	   the	   Court	   (2013-­‐2017)	   (McAuliffe	  2014).	  
the	  expansive	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  institutions.18	  	  In	  sharp	  contrast	  to	  the	  situation	   of	   the	   Court	   of	   the	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   however,	   a	  corresponding	  political	  science	  literature	  has	  not	  taken	  shape.	  	  One	   may	   certainly	   point	   to	   a	   number	   of	   important	   political	   science	  contributions	   to	   understanding	   the	   development	   and	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	  Convention	   system.	   Andrew	   Moravcsik,	   for	   example,	   has	   brought	   liberal	  intergovernmental	  theory	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  ECHR,	  highlighting	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  logic	   of	   ‘democratic	   delegation’	   as	   an	   explanation	   both	   for	   the	   origins	   of	   the	  system	   (Moravcsik	   2000)	   and	   for	   the	   foundations	   of	   its	   comparative	   success	  (Moravcsik	   1995).	   Helen	   Keller	   and	   Alec	   Stone	   Sweet	   (2008)	   coordinated	   a	  major	   interdisciplinary	   research	   project,	   assembling	   an	   international	   team	   of	  collaborators	   to	   examine	   the	   complex	   sets	   of	   legal	   and	   political	   factors	  accounting	   for	   the	   differential	   reception	   of	   the	   ECHR	   across	   a	   representative	  sample	   of	   eighteen	   member	   states.	   	   More	   recently,	   Jonas	   Christoffersen	   and	  Mikael	   Rask	   Madsen	   (2011)	   brought	   many	   of	   the	   (few)	   political	   scientists	  working	  on	   the	  Convention	   system	   together	  with	   leading	   legal	  practitioners	   to	  look	  at	   the	   law	  and	  politics	  of	   the	  ECHR	  at	   the	   time	  of	   its	   sixtieth	  anniversary,	  tackling	   such	   themes	   as	   the	   institutional	   development	   of	   the	   system,	   judicial	  voting	   patterns,	   the	   role	   of	   NGOs,	   and	   the	   sociological	   construction	   of	   the	  regional	   human	   rights	   ‘field’.	   	   Yet,	   while	   these	   and	   a	   limited	   number	   of	   other	  works	  undoubtedly	  point	  to	  the	  promise	  of	  political	  and	  social	  science	  research	  on	  the	  Convention,	  they	  remain	  relatively	  isolated	  studies.	  	  There	  is,	  in	  terms	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Major textbook surveys of ECHR case law include: Harris, O’Boyle, Bates and Warbrick (2009); 
White and Ovey (2010); Janis, Kay and Bradley (2008); and Mowbray (2012).	  
the	   development	   of	   a	   sustained	   body	   of	   scholarship,	   something	   of	   a	   ‘missing	  political	  science’	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  system.	  Clearly,	  the	  present	  short	  section	  cannot	  address	  this	  wider	  gap.	  	  It	  does,	  however,	   outline	   a	   broadly	   political	   understanding	   of	   the	   two	  major	   historical	  phases	  in	  the	  Convention	  system’s	  development	  to	  date,19	  in	  terms	  suggestive	  of	  the	  potential	  of	  a	  wider	  interdisciplinary	  research	  agenda.	  Specifically,	  attention	  is	   first	   turned	   to	   understanding	   the	   dynamics	   of	   the	   system’s	   initial	   ‘success’,	  focusing	   on	   the	   establishment	   and	   legitimation	   of	   the	   Convention	   as	   a	   West	  European	  system	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  during	  the	  Cold	  War	  period.	  	  This	  is	  followed,	  in	  turn,	  by	  an	  examination	  of	  the	  challenges	  faced	  by	  the	  system	  in	  the	  post-­‐Cold	  War	  period.	  	  Now	  the	  final	  recourse	  in	  human	  rights	  matters	  for	  a	  vast	  pan-­‐European	   community,	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   has	   seen	   its	   role	   dramatically	  transformed	  as	  it	  grapples	  with	  processes	  of	  democratic	  transition,	  and	  with	  the	  situations	  arising	  when	  such	  transitions	  have	  faltered	  or	  failed.	  	  	  
The	  Construction	  of	  Judicial	  Legitimacy	  The	   Convention,	   as	   initially	   agreed	   in	   1950,	   was	   a	   relatively	   modest	  document.	   	   The	   list	   of	   rights	   covered	  was	   comparatively	   limited	   –	   notably	   not	  extending	   to	   the	   social	   and	   economic	   rights	   covered	   by	   the	   1948	   Universal	  Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights.	   The	   attendant	   institutional	   supervisory	  mechanisms,	  bearing	  the	  marks	  of	  hard-­‐fought	  political	  compromise,	  were	  also	  rather	  restricted.	  States	  were	  initially	  obliged	  only	  to	  accept	  an	  interstate	  system	  of	   complaints,	  whereby	   they	  might	   bring	   cases	   against	   one	   another	   before	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 For an excellent historical overview of the ECHR, see Bates (2010).  By way of complement, 
Goldhaber (2007) engagingly details the background and significance of a selection of landmark cases 
with a strong emphasis on the personal stories of the individual litigants.	  
newly	   established	   European	   Commission	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   which	   could	   then	  issue	   an	   advisory	   opinion.	   	   The	   Convention	   did,	   however,	   also	   contain	   two	  optional	   provisions	   whereby	   states	   could	   opt	   into	   more	   expansive	   control	  mechanisms.	   	  Article	  25	  provided	   that	   states	   could	   accept	   a	   right	  of	   individual	  petition,	  allowing	  individuals	  to	  bring	  cases	  directly	  to	  the	  Commission	  once	  all	  domestic	   remedies	   had	   been	   exhausted.	   	   Article	   46	   provided	   for	   the	  establishment	   of	   a	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   which	   could	   render	   full	  judicial	   decisions	   against	   states	   accepting	   its	   jurisdiction	   at	   a	   second	   stage	   of	  proceedings	   (after	   the	   Commission	   stage).	   	   The	   strategic	   ‘gamble’	   of	   the	  Convention’s	  drafters	  was	   thus	   that	   states	  would	  progressively	   come	   to	  accept	  the	  full	  system	  of	  control	  around	  a	  limited	  core	  of	  classic	  liberal	  rights.	  	  The	   Strasbourg	   institutions	   were	   the	   central	   actors	   in	   this	   process	   of	  legitimation,	  with	  the	  Commission	  necessarily	  making	  much	  of	  the	  early	  running,	  later	   relayed	   by	   the	   Court.	   	   Through	   the	   1960s	   and	   1970s	   a	   series	   of	   key	  jurisprudential	   doctrines	   were	   developed	   which	   gave	   practical	   and	   often	  expansive	   effect	   to	   Convention	   rights,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   displaying	   a	  consistent	   sensitivity	   to	  national	  apprehensions	  about	   the	  emergence	  of	  overly	  intrusive	   forms	   of	   control	   at	   the	   European	   level.	   	   It	  was	   this	   careful	   balancing	  which	   crucially	   established	   the	   credibility	   of	   the	   Convention	   institutions	   with	  member	  states,	  litigants	  and	  wider	  stakeholder	  communities.	  From	   an	   early	   stage,	   the	   Strasbourg	   institutions	   affirmed	   that	   the	  Convention	  must	  be	   read	  as	   creating	   ‘objective’	   rights	  vested	   in	   the	   individual,	  and	  consequently	  not	  be	  subject	  to	  conditions	  of	  interstate	  reciprocity.	  	  Equally,	  Strasbourg	  jurisprudence	  has	  insisted	  that	  the	  ECHR	  be	  interpreted	  in	  line	  with	  its	   ‘object	   and	   purpose’	   as	   a	   human	   rights	   treaty,	   and	   correspondingly	   not	   be	  
bound	   by	   the	   conventional	   international	   law	   interpretive	   canon	   of	   reading	  provisions	   so	   as	   to	   minimise	   their	   impact	   on	   state	   sovereignty.	   	   In	   much	   the	  same	  vein,	   the	   implementation	  of	  rights	  at	   the	  national	   level	  must	  be	   ‘practical	  and	  effective’	  and	  not	   ‘theoretical	  and	  illusory’.	   	   	  Thus,	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  is	  taken	  to	  imply	  the	  right	  of	  access	  to	  a	  court,	  including	  the	  provision	  of	  legal	  aid	  where	   necessary.20	  	   In	   a	   similar	   vein,	   Convention	   rights	   have	   been	   developed	  through	   the	   technique	   of	   ‘evolutive	   interpretation’,	   whereby	   the	   Strasbourg	  authorities	   expand	   the	   scope	   of	   human	   rights	   protection	   in	   line	   with	   their	  reading	  of	  the	  evolving	  consensus	  of	  member	  states.	  	  It	  was,	  for	  example,	  on	  this	  basis	  that	  the	  Court	  found	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (as	  regards	  Northern	  Ireland)	  and	  the	  Republic	  of	  Ireland	  to	  be	  in	  violation	  of	  the	  Convention	  in	  the	  seminal	  1981	  
Dudgeon21	  and	  1988	  Norris22	  cases,	  holding	  that	  the	  statutory	  criminalisation	  of	  homosexuality	  no	  longer	  corresponded	  to	  contemporary	  European	  standards.	  	  Balancing	   this	   jurisprudential	   arsenal,	   however,	   the	   Strasbourg	  institutions	   also	   developed	   the	   doctrine	   of	   the	   ‘margin	   of	   appreciation’.	   	   This	  holds,	  as	  regards	  those	  rights	  where	  states	  must	  legitimately	  balance	  competing	  claims,	   that	   the	   European	   authorities	   will	   show	   a	   degree	   of	   due	   deference	   to	  their	   national	   counterparts	   insofar	   as	   the	   latter	   ‘by	   reason	   of	   their	   direct	   and	  continuous	  contact	  with	   the	  vital	   forces	  of	   their	   countries’	   are	  better	  placed	   to	  appreciate	  the	  necessity	  of	  particular	  measures	  or	  restrictions.	  	  In	  an	  early	  case	  of	   this	   type,	   the	   Court	   thus	   found	  no	   violation	   as	   regards	   a	   British	   ban	   on	   the	  publication	  of	  an	  educational	  manual	  for	  adolescents	  including	  frank	  discussions	  of	  drugs	  and	  sex,	  even	  though	  the	  book	  (‘The	  Little	  Red	  Schoolbook’)	  was	  freely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 See Airey v. Ireland, ECtHR decision of 9 October 1979 on application no. 6289/73.	  
21 Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR decision of 22 October 1981 on application no. 7527/76.	  
22 Norris v. Ireland, ECtHR decision of 26 October 1988 on application no. 10581/83.	  
available	   in	   a	   number	   of	   other	  Convention	  member	   states.23	  	   In	   this,	   the	  Court	  explicitly	   deferred	   to	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	   national	   authorities,	   seen	   as	   better	  placed	   to	   make	   determinations	   as	   regards	   matters	   of	   public	   morals.	   The	  application	   of	   this	   principle	   has,	   as	   one	  would	   expect,	   often	   drawn	   very	   sharp	  criticism.	   	  Two	  prominent	  ECHR	  experts	  have,	   for	  example,	  memorably	   likened	  the	  use	  of	  the	  doctrine	  to	  a	  ‘spreading	  disease’	  (van	  Dijk	  and	  van	  Hoof	  1990:	  604-­‐605).	  	  Yet,	  seen	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  Strasbourg	  authorities,	  the	  margin	  of	   appreciation	   is	   a	   necessary	   ‘constitutional	   principle’	   providing	   for	   the	  demarcation	   of	   the	   spheres	   of	   primary	   national	   and	   subsidiary	   European	  responsibility.	  	  	  This	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   long	   term	   logics	   which	   have	   governed	   the	  evolution	  of	  the	  system.	  	  The	  bold	  jurisprudential	  strokes	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  in	  Luxembourg	  find	  only	  a	  partial	  parallel	  in	  Strasbourg.	  	  The	  strategy	  by	  which	  the	  ECHR	  has	  been	  developed	  has	  been	  rather	  more	  one	  of	  a	  ‘cautious	  ambition’	  –	  pushing	  at	  the	  bounds	  of	  public	   international	   law,	  but	  not	  seeking	  to	  create	  a	  new	   type	   of	   legal	   order.	   	   In	   this	   respect,	   it	   should	   be	   underlined	   that	   the	  relationship	  between	  Strasbourg	  and	  national	  authorities	  is	  not	  the	  same	  as	  that	  which	   prevails	   under	   EU	   law.	   	   There	   is	   no	   preliminary	   reference	   mechanism	  connecting	   national	   courts	   to	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	   Rights.	   	   The	  Convention	  is	  also	  not	  directly	  effective	  in	  national	  legal	  orders,	  but	  rather	  has	  a	  differing	   domestic	   legal	   status	   in	   function	   of	   different	   national	   modes	   of	  incorporation.	  	  The	  nexus	  between	  the	  national	  and	  the	  European	  legal	  order	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, ECtHR judgment of 7 December 1976 on application no. 
5493/72.	  
thus	  somewhat	  more	  attenuated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  ECHR,	  and	  is	   largely	  defined	  by	  the	  sanctioning	  of	  acts	  of	  national	  authorities,	  including	  national	  courts.	  Overall	   the	   initial	   strategic	   ‘gamble’	  may	   be	   seen	   to	   have	   paid	   off	   –	   but	  also	   to	   have	   shown	   its	   limits.	   	   The	   original	   control	   system	   did	   come	   to	   be	  generally	  accepted,	  opening	  the	  way	   for	  a	  major	  reform	  of	   the	  system	  with	   the	  entry	   into	   force	   of	   Protocol	   11	   in	  1998.	  This	  Protocol	   saw	   the	  part-­‐time	  Court	  and	  Commission	  replaced	  by	  a	   single-­‐tier,	   full-­‐time	  Court	  with	  a	  direct	   right	  of	  individual	   petition.	   	   Yet,	   it	   should	   also	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   substantive	   rights	  covered	  by	  the	  Convention	  system	  have	  only	  been	  very	  modestly	  expanded	  since	  1950	  –	  with,	  most	  notably,	   the	  development	  of	  both	   social	   rights	  and	  minority	  rights	   within	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   system	   having	   taken	   place	   through	   the	  creation	  of	  separate	  conventions	  with	  no	  provision	  for	  judicial	  oversight.	  24	  	  
The	  Challenges	  of	  Enlargement	  The	   Council	   of	   Europe	   enlarged	   rapidly	   in	   the	   1990s.	   	   Hungary	   already	  became	  the	  first	  post-­‐Communist	  state	  to	  join	  the	  organisation	  in	  1990.	  	  Further	  enlargements	  followed	  in	  quick	  succession,	  including	  the	  controversial	  accession	  of	  the	  Russian	  Federation	  in	  1996.	  	  By	  the	  end	  of	  the	  decade,	  17	  post-­‐Communist	  states	   had	   joined,	   on	   the	   road	   to	   the	   Council’s	   now	   near	   comprehensive	   pan-­‐European	  membership	  of	  47	   states.	   	  This	   rapid	  enlargement	  was	   facilitated	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  strategy	  of	  what	  might	  be	  termed	  ‘post	  hoc	  conditionality’.	   	  In	  contrast	   to	   the	   European	   Union,	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   from	   1993	   onwards,	  adopted	   an	   explicit	   strategy	   whereby	   states	   deemed	   not	   to	   meet	   certain	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The original European Social Charter was adopted in 1961 and first came into force for those states 
which had ratified it in 1965.  A revised treaty was adopted in 1996 and first entered into force in 1999.  
The Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities was adopted in 1995 and first 
entered into force in 1998. The wider functions of the Council of Europe are surveyed in Bond (2011).	  
minimum	   entry	   criteria	   as	   regards	   democracy	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   were	  nonetheless	   permitted	   to	   join	   the	   organisation,	   on	   the	   condition	   that	   they	  submitted	  to	  monitored	  post-­‐accession	  processes	  of	  reform	  in	  order	  to	  remedy	  the	   specified	   deficiencies.	   	   For	   proponents	   of	   the	   strategy,	   it	   was	   seen	   as	   an	  effective	  means	  of	  reinforcing	  processes	  of	  democratic	  transition	  from	  within	  the	  organisation.	   	   The	   strategy	   nonetheless	   also	   attracted	   sharp	   criticism.	   	   Most	  prominently,	  the	  then	  Deputy	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  Peter	  Leuprecht,	  resigned	  in	  protest	  at	  what	  he	  regarded	  as	  an	  unacceptable	  dilution	  of	  the	  organisation’s	  core	  values	  (cf.	  Harmsen	  2001).	  Whatever	   the	   merits	   of	   the	   approach,	   it	   dramatically	   changed	   the	  landscape	  within	  which	  the	  ECHR	  system	  operates,	  as	  accession	  to	  the	  ECHR	  was	  made	  a	  mandatory	  condition	  of	  Council	  of	  Europe	  membership.	   	  Quantitatively,	  the	   already	   marked	   growth	   of	   cases	   coming	   to	   Strasbourg	   accelerated	  exponentially.	   	   Qualitatively,	   the	   ECHR	   institutions	   were	   faced	   with	   dramatic	  new	   challenges,	  well	   beyond	   the	   ‘fine	   tuning’	   of	   firmly	   established	   democratic	  regimes	   which	   had	   been	   the	   normal	   stock	   in	   trade	   of	   the	   Convention	   system	  during	  the	  first	  decades	  of	  its	  existence.	  The	   quantitative	   explosion	   of	   the	   demands	   placed	   on	   the	   Strasbourg	  institutions	  may	  be	  illustrated	  by	  looking	  at	  typical	  caseload	  figures	  prior	  to	  the	  wave	   of	   post-­‐Cold	   War	   enlargements	   in	   comparison	   to	   those	   of	   the	   current	  Court.	   	   In	  1989,	  4,923	  new	  petitions	  were	  lodged	  in	  Strasbourg,	  of	  which	  1,445	  were	   allocated	   to	   a	   decisional	   body.	   	   Under	   the	   old	   two-­‐tier	   system,	   the	  Commission	  that	  year	  took	  1,338	  decisions,	  finding	  1,243	  petitions	  inadmissible	  and	   95	   admissible.	   	   The	   Court	   rendered	   25	   decisions.	   	   By	   way	   of	   contrast,	   in	  2012,	   the	  single-­‐tier	   full-­‐time	  court	  received	  65,150	  petitions.	   	   It	  handed	  down	  
86,201	  decisions	  of	  inadmissibility,	  as	  well	  as	  1,678	  full	  judgments	  on	  the	  merits.	  	  This	  left	  the	  Court	  with	  an	  accumulated	  backlog	  of	  128,100	  cases,	  down	  from	  a	  high	  watermark	  of	   over	   160,000	   cases.	   	   Put	   even	  more	   starkly,	   the	  Court	   now	  typically	   receives	   around	   50%	  more	   petitions	   every	   year	   than	   the	   Strasbourg	  institutions	   had	   received	   during	   the	   entire	   period	   from	   1955	   until	   1988	  (44,199).	  The	   geographical	   distribution	   of	   this	   exponentially	   expanding	   caseload	  must	  also	  be	  underlined.	  	  The	  ‘old’	  West	  European	  democracies	  now	  account	  for	  only	   about	   20%	  of	   the	   Court’s	   caseload	   at	   both	   the	   petition	   and	   the	   judgment	  stage.	  	  Conversely,	  the	  post-­‐Communist	  states	  annually	  account	  for	  around	  70%	  of	   the	  petitions	   received	  and	  between	  50	   to	  60%	  of	   the	   judgments	   rendered.25	  	  More	   strikingly,	   four	   countries	  alone	  –	  Russia,	  Ukraine,	  Romania,	   and	  Turkey	   -­‐	  routinely	  account	  for	  over	  half	  of	  the	  judgments	  handed	  down	  by	  the	  ECtHR	  each	  year	  (Harmsen	  2010:	  30-­‐32).	  This	   geographic	   shift	   in	   the	   focus	   of	   the	   Court’s	   attention	   has	   also,	   of	  course,	  seen	  a	  qualitative	  shift	  in	  the	  types	  of	  cases	  coming	  to	  Strasbourg.	  	  Most	  immediately,	   the	   Court	   found	   itself	   playing	   an	   often	   key	   role	   in	   processes	   of	  democratic	   transition.	   	   Narrowly,	   the	   ECtHR	   was	   called	   upon	   to	   judge	   the	  Convention	   compatibility	   of	   transitional	  measures	   themselves.	   Here,	   the	   Court	  has	   essentially	   had	   to	   establish	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   temporary	   limitations	   on	  specific	   rights	   (such	   as	   lustration	   or	   disenfranchisement	  measures)	   fall	  within	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 Turkey is something of an anomalous case relative to this broad-brush categorisation, being neither a 
post-Communist state nor an ‘old’ democracy.  A Council of Europe member since 1949, Turkey 
participated in the initial drafting of the ECHR and ratified the Convention in 1954.  Nonetheless, 
under the pre-Protocol 11 regime, it only very belatedly accepted the right of individual petition (1987) 
and the jurisdiction of the Court (1990).  This produced, in the mid-1990s, the first major wave of cases 
coming to Strasbourg in which the Court was confronted with serious, systemic problems of human 
rights protection, concerned particularly with the treatment of the Kurdish minority.  In more recent 
years, Turkey has generally accounted for around 20% of judgments delivered and 10% of petitions 
filed. See further Kaboğlu and Koutnatzis (2008).” 	  
the	  national	  margin	  of	  appreciation,	  insofar	  as	  such	  restrictions	  could	  be	  argued	  to	   be	   in	   the	   long	   term	   interests	   of	   consolidating	   newly	   (re-­‐)established	  democratic	  regimes	  (Varju	  2009).	  	  More	  widely,	  the	  Court	  has	  further	  served	  as	  a	  buttress	   for	   the	   grounding	   of	   liberal	   democratic	   institutions,	   in	   particular	  enhancing	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   a	   number	   of	   constitutional	   courts	   through	   the	  development	  of	   strong,	  mutually	   reinforcing	   judicial	   dialogues	   (Sadurski	   2012:	  1-­‐51).	   If	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   has	   played	   a	   perhaps	   underestimated	   role	   as	   a	  positive	   agent	   of	   change	   in	   processes	   of	   democratic	   transitions,	   one	   must,	  however,	   also	   acknowledge	   that	   the	   contemporary	   Convention	   community	  further	   extends	   to	   a	   significant	   number	   of	   countries	   in	   which	   such	   reform	  processes	  have	  not	  been	  successful	  –	  at	  best	  stalling,	  if	  not	  being	  subject	  to	  direct	  reversal.	   	   The	   Court	   must	   now	   deal	   with	   situations	   in	   which	   an	   effective,	  independent	   judiciary	   simply	   does	   not	   exist	   at	   the	   domestic	   level.	   	   Still	   more	  dramatically,	   the	   Court	   has	   been	   confronted	  with	   situations	   of	   armed	   conflict,	  where	   sovereignty	   is	   fundamentally	   contested	   and	  a	   stable	  politico-­‐legal	   order	  does	  not	  exist.	   	   	  Cases	  stemming	   from	  the	  conflicts	   in	  Abkhazia,	  Chechnya,	  and	  Transnistria	  have	  all	  found	  their	  way	  on	  to	  its	  docket.	  	  In	   dealing	   with	   these	   situations,	   the	   Court	   has	   demonstrated	   a	  noteworthy	   jurisprudential	   innovativeness.	   	   The	   development	   of	   the	   ‘pilot	  judgment’	   procedure	   has,	   for	   example,	   provided	   the	   Court	   with	   a	   means	   to	  address	   structural	   problems,	   using	   a	   single,	   literally	   exemplary	   case	   to	   engage	  both	   national	   and	   European-­‐level	   authorities	   in	   wider	   reform	   processes.26	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 See, for example, Burdov v. Russia no. 2, judgment of 15 January 2009 on application no. 33509/04, 
concerned with the provision of adequate remedies for the non-execution of judicial decisions. See also 
the discussion of the case in Leach, Hardman and Stephenson (2010).	  
Confronted	  with	   the	   effective	   breakdown	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   the	   Court	   too	   has	  been	  willing	  to	  innovate.	  	  It	  has	  thus	  shown	  a	  willingness	  to	  assign	  responsibility	  for	  human	  rights	  violations	  to	  the	  authorities	   in	  de	  facto	  control	  of	  a	  particular	  territory,	  irrespective	  of	  formal	  jurisdiction.27	  	  So	  too	  has	  it	  applied	  human	  rights	  law	  in	  conflict	  situations	  where	  public	  international	  law	  would	  normally	  dictate	  that	   humanitarian	   law	   be	   applied.28	  Yet,	   despite	   its	   creative	   handling	   of	   such	  situations,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  been	  pushed	  to,	  if	  not	  beyond	  the	  limits	  of	  that	   which	   may	   reasonably	   be	   achieved	   through	   a	   judicial	   framework	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  wider,	  sustaining	  political	  dynamics.	  Faced	   with	   such	   major	   challenges,	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	   discussions	  concerning	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   ECHR	   system	   have	   become	   a	   constant	   refrain	  (Harmsen	   2011).	   	   Much	   of	   this	   discussion	   has	   focused	   on	   ‘the	   numbers’,	  essentially	  seeking	  ways	  to	  prevent	  the	  Court	  from	  becoming	  ‘asphyxiated’	  by	  its	  growing	   caseload	   in	   the	   telling	   terms	   used	   by	   former	   Court	   President	   Luzius	  Wildhaber	   (2002:	   164).	   	   The	   emphasis	   here	   is	   particularly	   on	   procedural	  measures,	   intended	   to	  allow	   the	  Court	   to	  dispose	   (even	  more)	  expeditiously	  of	  the	   over	   90%	   of	   applications	   ruled	   to	   be	   inadmissible	   at	   the	   first	   stage	   of	  proceedings.	  	  Protocol	  14,	  which	  finally	  entered	  into	  force	  in	  2010	  after	  a	  lengthy	  Russian	  blockage,	   introduced	   a	  modest	   package	  of	   provisions	   in	   this	   direction.	  	  Nevertheless,	   even	   as	   this	   protocol	   was	   being	   adopted,	   strong	   views	   were	  expressed	   from	   both	   within	   the	   Court	   and	   the	   wider	   expert	   community	   that	  further	  and	  deeper	  reform	  would	  be	  necessary	  if	  the	  system	  was	  not	  to	  collapse	  under	  its	  own	  weight.	   	  A	  further	  round	  of	  reform	  discussions	  was	  consequently	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 See, notably, Assanidze v. Georgia, judgment of 8 April 2004 on application no. 71503/01 and Ilasçu 
and Others v. Moldova and Russia, judgment of 8 July 2004 on application no. 48787/99.	  
28 This has been particularly marked in the Court’s handling of the Chechen cases.  See further Leach 
(2008). 	  
opened,	  beginning	  with	  the	  high-­‐level	   Interlaken	  meeting	   in	  2010,	  and	  thus	   far	  carried	  forward	  by	  two	  further	  meetings	  at	  Izmir	  (2011)	  and	  Brighton	  (2012).	  Although	   attention	  has	  understandably	   focused	  on	   immediate	  measures	  to	   	   	   alleviate	   caseload	   pressures,	   the	   reform	   of	   the	   Convention	   system	  nevertheless	   cannot	   be	   understood	   only	   in	   terms	   of	   the	   ‘nuts	   and	   bolts’	   of	  procedural	  tinkering.	  	  Increasingly,	  it	  must	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  posing	  more	  of	  an	   existential	   question,	   asking	   what	   purposes	   the	   ECHR	   is	   fundamentally	  intended	  to	  serve	  in	  relation	  to	  its	  much	  enlarged,	  highly	  diverse	  community	  of	  member	  states.	   	  Relative	  to	  this	  existential	  question,	  recent	  years	  have	  seen	  the	  emergence	   of	   a	   debate	   between	   distinct	   ‘constitutional’	   and	   ‘individual	   justice’	  interpretations	  of	   the	  Court’s	   role	   (Greer	  2006:	  165-­‐174;	  Harmsen	  2007).	   	  The	  ‘constitutionalists’	   argue	   that	   the	   fundamental	   role	   of	   the	   Court	   is	   as	   that	   of	   a	  European	   standard	   setter,	   with	   individual	   cases	   serving	   primarily	   as	   the	   ‘raw	  material’	   from	  which	   it	   shapes	   these	  wider	   principles.	   	   The	   proponents	   of	   the	  ‘individual	  justice’	  position,	  conversely,	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  the	  provision	  of	  effective	  remedies	   in	   individual	   cases	   that	   is	   the	   institution’s	   raison	   d’être,	   and	   that	   to	  abandon	   this	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   more	   selective	   constitutional	   mission	   would	   risk	  undermining	  its	   legitimacy.	   	  The	  debate,	   interestingly,	  has	  engaged	  members	  of	  the	   Court,	   academics	   and	   practitioners	   on	   both	   sides	   –	  marking	   the	   first	   such	  broad	  public	  airing	  of	  concerns	  about	  the	  institution’s	  long	  term	  direction.	  	  
Conclusion:	  Inter-­‐Court	  Relations	  and	  EU	  Accession	  to	  the	  ECHR	  The	   previous	   sections	   have	   briefly	   surveyed	   the	   growing	   importance	  assumed	  by	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  wider	  political	  processes.	  Yet,	  as	  outlined	  in	  the	  introduction	  
to	   this	   chapter,	   the	   European	   Courts	   cannot	   be	   understood	   in	   isolation;	   the	  specific	  roles	  which	  they	  have	  respectively	  assumed	  must	  be	  situated	  relative	  to	  European	   (and	   international)	   trends	   regarding	   the	   ‘judicialisation	   of	   politics’.	  	  Each	  of	   the	  previous	   sections	  has	  already	   touched	  on	  elements	  of	   this	  broader	  canvas,	   inescapably	  making	   reference	   to	   the	  patterns	   of	   relationships	   between	  the	   European	   Courts	   and	   their	   national	   counterparts,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   questions	  concerned	  with	  the	  levels	  of	  member	  state	  support	  or	  resistance.	  	  Nevertheless,	  one	  key	  element	  in	  this	  pattern	  of	  relationships	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  discussed	  –	  that	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  Luxembourg	  and	  Strasbourg	  Courts	  themselves.	  	  It	   is	   the	   different	   dimensions	   of	   this	   relationship	   which	   are	   the	   focus	   of	   this	  concluding	  section.	  Most	   obviously,	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   two	   courts	   concerns	   the	  development	  of	  case	  law	  in	  areas	  of	  intersecting	  concern.	  	  Prompted	  by	  national	  constitutional	   courts,	   the	   Court	   of	   Justice	   has,	   since	   the	   1970s,	   developed	   a	  human	  rights	  jurisprudence	  in	  the	  context	  of	  EU	  law	  by	  way	  of	  reference	  to	  the	  ECHR,	  as	  well	  as	   to	  other	   international	   instruments	  and	  national	  constitutional	  traditions.	   	   The	   adoption	   of	   the	   EU’s	   own	  Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights,	   as	   a	  declaratory	  instrument	  in	  2000	  and	  with	  binding	  force	  since	  2009,	  has	  added	  a	  further	  human	   rights	  dimension	   to	   the	  work	  of	   the	  Luxembourg	  Court.29	  	  As	   it	  has	   assumed	   these	   roles,	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   conflict	   or	   divergence	   with	  Strasbourg	   jurisprudence	  has	   correspondingly	   emerged.	   	  Historically,	   a	   limited	  number	   of	   comparatively	   prominent	   instances	   of	   such	   divergence	   may	   be	  identified,	  usually	  corresponding	  to	  a	  situation	   in	  which	  the	  Luxembourg	  Court	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 It should be underlined that the Court of Justice is only empowered to adjudicate on human rights 
questions within the remit of EU law – i.e. as regards EU institutions and member states when 
discharging EU obligations.  It does not, unlike the ECtHR, have a general human rights jurisdiction. 
privileged	  market	   regulation	   concerns	   over	   individual	   rights	   considerations	   in	  the	   balancing	   of	   competing	   claims	   (cf.	   Lawson	   1994;	   Spielmann	   1999).	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  longer	  term	  trend	  has	  clearly	  been	  one	  in	  which	  the	  two	  courts	  have	   tended	   to	   display	   a	   growing	   awareness	   of	   one	   another’s	   jurisprudence,	  generally	   adopting	   positions	  which	  minimise	   or	   avoid	   the	   possibility	   of	   direct	  conflict	  (cf.	  Douglas-­‐Scott	  2006).	  This	   evolution	   of	   case	   law	   in	   turn	   relates	   to	   the	   development	   of	   the	  patterns	  of	  politico-­‐diplomatic	  relationships	  between	  the	  two	  courts.	  	  As	  Laurent	  Scheeck	   (2010;	   2005)	   highlights,	   the	   two	   courts	   have	   become	   increasingly	  ‘entangled’.	   	   This	   entanglement	   in	   part	   stems	   from	   the	   direct	  multiplication	   of	  contacts	  between	  the	  members	  of	  the	  two	  courts,	  notably	  at	  the	  highest	  level.	  	  It	  is	   also	   grounded	   in	   wider	   processes	   of	   ‘transnational	   socialisation’,	   whereby	  strategically	   placed	   legal	   elites	   have	   increasingly	   redefined	   themselves	   in	  relation	   to	   a	   shared	   European	   legal	   field.	   	   Yet,	   despite	   this	   growing	   sense	   of	  common	   interests,	   Scheeck	   further	   notes	   that	   the	   relationship	   between	  Strasbourg	   and	   Luxembourg	   Courts	   may	   nonetheless	   still	   appear	   ‘relatively	  brittle’	  (Scheeck	  2011:	  179).	   	   In	  effect,	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  two	  courts	  reflects	  the	  dual	  character	  of	  judicialisation	  discussed	  in	  the	  introduction.	  	  Here	  as	   elsewhere,	   courts	   may	   be	   seen	   to	   have	   a	   shared	   interest	   in	   the	   overall	  enhancement	  of	  the	  judicial	  role,	  but	  also	  possibly	  divergent	  interests	  as	  regards	  their	  relative	  status	  or	  positions.	  This	   duality	   is	   perhaps	   nowhere	   more	   in	   evidence	   than	   in	   the	   current	  negotiations	   concerning	   the	   accession	   of	   the	   European	  Union	   to	   the	   European	  
Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights. 30 	  	   Overcoming	   various	   historical	   pockets	   of	  resistance,	  the	  principle	  of	  such	  an	  accession	  has	  now	  become	  a	  matter	  of	  broad	  consensus	   –	   as	   evidenced	   by	   the	   inclusion	   of	   general	   provisions	   providing	   for	  accession	   in	   both	   Protocol	   14	   to	   the	   ECHR	   and	   the	   EU’s	   Lisbon	   Treaty.	  	  Nonetheless,	   though	  the	  principle	  has	  been	  accepted,	   the	  negotiations,	   formally	  opened	   in	   2010,	   have	   proved	   to	   be	   a	   predictably	   thorny	   affair.	   	   Apart	   from	  (devilishly	   complex)	   technical	   considerations,	   one	   of	   the	   main	   areas	   of	  discussion	  has	  concerned	  a	  demand	  made	  by	  the	  Court	  of	   Justice	   to	  establish	  a	  ‘prior	  involvement’	  mechanism,	  whereby	  it	  could	  ensure	  that	   it	  would	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  pronounce	  on	  any	  possible	  violation	  of	  Convention	  rights	  within	  the	  remit	  of	  EU	  law	  before	  the	  case	  is	  heard	  in	  Strasbourg.	  	  While	  there	  has	  been	  an	   acceptance	   of	   such	   a	  mechanism	   in	   the	   negotiations	   to	   date,	   the	   proposed	  terms	  of	   its	  operation	  have	  fuelled	  more	  general	  concerns	  amongst	  the	  non-­‐EU	  members	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   as	   regards	   the	   emergence	   of	   a	   potentially	  inequitable	  dual	  track	  system.	  	   Indeed,	   more	   generally,	   it	   should	   be	   recalled	   that	   the	   relationship	  between	   the	   Strasbourg	   and	   the	  Luxembourg	   courts	   concerns	  not	   just	   the	   two	  judicial	   bodies,	   but	   also	   the	   broader	   patterns	   of	   relationships	   between	   the	  ‘Europe	  of	  the	  28’	  and	  the	  ‘Europe	  of	  the	  47’.	   	  The	  questions	  which	  it	  raises	  are	  thus	  eminently	  political	  ones,	  not	   the	   least	  concerned	  with	   the	  (often	  criticised	  lack	   of)	   coordination	   between	   the	   EU’s	   internal	   and	   external	   human	   rights	  dimensions	  (Alston	  and	  Weiler	  1999;	  Williams	  2005),	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  place	  of	  such	   countries	   as	   Russia,	   Turkey	   and	   Ukraine	   in	   relation	   to	   various	   forms	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30  The background to and main issues posed by accession are surveyed in Gragl (2013) and Kosta, 
Skoutaris and Tzevelekos (2014 forthcoming). 
European	   cooperation.	   	   Ultimately,	  we	   are	   thus	   led	   back	   to	   a	   quite	   traditional	  geopolitics,	   delimiting	   the	   effective	   reach	   of	   a	   distinctive	   European	   model	   of	  governance	  which	  has	  placed	  sovereignty	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	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